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Tiivistelmä 
2000-luvulla alkanut maailmanlaajuinen talouskriisi on pakottanut monet keskuspankit laajentamaan rahapolitiikan 
instrumenttejaan. Ennen kriisiä, rahapolitiikan pääasiallinen instrumentti oli keskuspankin ohjauskorko. Kun korot laskivat nollaan, 
keskuspankkien oli otettava käyttöön uusia rahapolitiikan instrumentteja. Laajat omaisuuserien osto-ohjelmat ovat yksi tällaisista 
niin kutsutuista epätavanomaisista rahapolitiikan instrumenteista. Euroopan keskuspankki (EKP) laajensi aikaisempia osto-
ohjelmiaan vuonna 2016, kun se ilmoitti aloittavansa yrityslainojen ostot. EKP:n motivaatio yrityssektorin velkapapereiden osto-
ohjelman (CSPP) aloittamiseen oli tukea jo käytössä olevia epätavanomaisen rahapolitiikan keinoja, jotta inflaatio saataisiin 
nousemaan lähelle tavoitetasoaan. Tutkielman tarkoituksena on tutkia CSPP:n julkistamisen vaikutuksia talouteen ja selvittää, 
mitkä ovat mahdollisten vaikutusten välittymiskanavat. Tutkielma keskittyy tutkimaan yrityslainojen tuottojen ja korko-odotusten 
muutoksia ohjelman julkistamispäivinä. 
 
Tutkimuksen kohteena ovat kahden joukkovelkakirjaindeksin tuottojen sekä korkojen vaihdantasopimusten hintojen muutokset. 
Muutoksia tutkitaan valittuina tapahumapäivinä käyttäen event study -menetelmää.Tutkimuksen kohteena ovat myös EKP:n 
keräämän ekonomistien kyselytutkimuksen (The Survey of Professional Forecasters  tai SPF) tulokset korkoennusteista. Tutkitaan, 
kuinka korkoennusteet muuttuivat niiden kyselyiden välillä, jotka suoritettiin ennen ja jälkeen CSPP:n julkistamisen. Tulokset 
osoittavat, että CSPP:n julkistaminen laski molempien tutkittujen joukkovelkakirjaindeksien tuottoja. Välittymiskanavista todisteita 
löydetään portfoliokanavalle, duraatioriskikanavalle, paikallisen tarjonnan kanavalle sekä signalointikanavalle. Tulokset ovat 
linjassa EKP:n aikaisemmista osto-ohjelmista tehtyjen tutkimusten tuloksien kanssa. 
 
Tulevaisuuden, elpyneen talouden, rahapolitiikan muoto ei ole vielä selvillä. Tällä hetkellä keskuspankeilla on suuria määriä osto-
ohjelmia varten ostettuja omaisuuseriä taseissaan. Osto-ohjelmien purkaminen on tehtävä varoen ja kestää luultavasti useita 
vuosia. Ennakoivan viestinnän tärkeys korostuu, kun EKP alkaa ajaa alas osto-ohjelmiaan.  
Avainsanat 
määrällinen elvyttäminen 
epätavanomainen rahapolitiikka 
osto-ohjelmat 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty  
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Department 
Department of Political and Economic Studies 
Author 
 Nea Marjaana Hänninen 
Title 
 Effects of ECB's Corporate Sector Purchase Programme on the European corporate bond market 
Subject 
Economics 
Level 
 Master’s Thesis 
Month and year 
August 2017 
Number of pages 
63 
Abstract 
The global financial crisis that started in the beginning of the 21st century has forced many central banks to expand their range of 
monetary policy instruments. Before the crisis, the main monetary policy instrument was the policy interest rate. When the policy 
rates hit the zero lower bound, the central banks needed to implement new monetary policy measures. One of these so called 
unconventional monetary policy measures is extensive purchase programmes. European Central Bank (ECB) expanded its 
existing purchase programmes in 2016 when it announced that it will start purchasing corporate bonds. ECB's motivation to start 
the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) was to support the already existing unconventional monetary policy measures 
to attain the inflation rate of near but under 2 %. The object of thesis is to study did the announcement of CSPP affect the economy 
and what was the mechanism behind the possible effects. Thesis concentrates to examine the changes on corporate bond yields 
and changes on the interest rate expectations. 
 
Yield reactions of two bond indexes and the price reactions of interest rate swap contracts are studied on the CSPP related 
announcement dates using event study methodology. The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by ECB is studied 
to determine the possible changes in interest rate expectations of the forecasters before and after the CSPP announcement. 
Results show that the CSPP related announcements decreased bond yields of both bond indexes. Evidence supporting the 
portfolio balancing channel, duration risk channel, local supply channel and signalling channel are found. Results are in line with 
the other studies regarding ECB's previous purchase programmes. 
 
The form of future monetary policy, after the economy has recovered, is still unknown. Currently, central banks have massive 
holdings of assets purchased under various programmes and the dissolution of the purchase programmes need to be done 
carefully and will probably take several years. Forward guidance will be on important role when ECB starts to shut down the 
purchase programme. 
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1 Introduction
Central banks have introduced different kind of purchase programmes during the
recent decade to expand their range of monetary policy instruments. Previously
the main monetary policy instrument was the policy interest rate. When the policy
rates hit the zero lower bound, the central banks needed to implement new monetary
policy measures, including asset purchase programme. Euroarea inflation started to
decrease on the beginning of 2012 and kept lowering until it went negative on the
end of 2014. ECB decreased its policy rate multiple times, starting from the middle
of 2011. ECB’s deposit facility rate hit zero on November 2013. ECB started the
public sector purchase programme in January 2015 to stimulate the economy and
help the inflation to get more close to ECB’s target rate.
ECB expanded the existing purchase programmes in 2016 when it announced that
it will start purchasing corporate bonds. The first official announcement to start
the programme was made in March 2016 and the purchases started on June 2016.
ECB’s motivation to start the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) was
to support the already existing unconventional monetary policy measures to attain
the inflation rate of near but under 2 %. The object of my thesis is to study did the
announcement of CSPP affect the economy and what was the mechanism behind the
possible effects. I will concentrate my study to examine the changes on corporate
bond yields and changes on the interest rate expectations.
My hypothesis is that the yields of bonds that are eligible for CSPP purchased de-
creased after the ECB’s announcement of the programme. If the arbitrageurs in the
corporate programme market have a special demand for bonds with certain maturity,
the yields may decrease also for bonds that are not eligible for purchases but have
the same maturity structure than the bonds that ECB is purchasing. Bonds with
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long maturity have higher duration risk than the bonds with smaller maturities. If
the ECB’s purchases have decreased the duration risk, the yields of long maturity
bonds should have decreased more than the yields of bonds with small maturity.
Besides the effect on bond yields, the announcement of the CSPP have probably
affected the expectations about ECB’s future policy rate. When ECB commits to
buy bonds it gives a signal to the market that it will not increase the policy rate
in the near future. I will study if the CSPP announcement affected the economy
through this so-called signalling channel.
Most of the studies regarding the purchase programmes are from the recent 15 years.
The increased implementation of purchase programmes and other unconventional
monetary policy measures has motivated the researchers. The studies regarding the
purchase programmes generally agrees with the effect of the programme and dis-
agree with the magnitude and persistence. Programmes that have been introduced
in the most turbulent financial situations are noticed to have larger effects on the
economy (Altavilla et al., 2015).
Different purchase programmes affect the economy through different transmission
channels, depending on the characteristics of the assets being purchased and their
maturities. Event studies are a common method used when studying the effects of
purchase programmes. Event studies are usually used when assessing the immedi-
ate effect of the announcement to start a certain purchase programme have on the
economy. Most of the purchase programme related event studies study the effect of
the announcement to asset yields, but also the effects to equity prices or interest
rates are studied.
In the empirical part of my thesis, I study the effects of CSPP related announce-
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ments on bond yields. I do an event study to examine how the announcements
affected yields of the bonds being purchased and I will also study if the announce-
ment cause spillover to the bonds that are not eligible for CSPP purchases. Besides
the yield effects, I also assess whether the announcements changed the expectations
of ECB’s future policy rate. I use the prices of interest rate swap contracts as a
proxy of ECB’s policy rate. I do an event study on how swap prices with different
maturities reacted to the CSPP related announcements.
CSPP is very recent programme and the research done regarding it is yet limited.
The main motivation for my thesis is to fill this gap. Even though ECB’s other
purchase programmes and especially the public sector purchase programme (PSPP)
has been studied, the transmission mechanisms can be completely different on each
purchase programme. Studies regarding the corporate sector purchase programmes
of other central banks can be helpful but not fully comparable, because every coun-
try and its bond market have its own characteristics that can affect the functionality
of the purchase programme. The point of time of the implementation of the pro-
gramme and the financial situation of that time also affects the effectiveness of the
programme.
The structure of my thesis is the following. The institutional background of the
purchase programmes are describes on chapter 2 and review of the previous literature
regarding them on chapter 3. The empirical part of my thesis follows that on
chapters 4-6. The strategy for my empirical is described on chapter 4. Chapter
5 describes the data used and the way that it has been collected.The results are
describes on chapter 5 and the final chapter concludes the thesis.
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2 Institutional Background
The global financial crisis that started in the beginning of the 21st century has forced
many central banks to expand their range of monetary policy instruments. Before
the crisis, the main monetary policy instrument was the policy interest rate. When
the policy rates hit the zero lower bound, the central banks needed to implement
new monetary policy measures. One of these so called unconventional monetary
policy measures is extensive purchase programmes. Central banks purchase large
quantities of predetermined type of assets from the markets. Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Bank of England, Bank of Japan and European Central Bank are the central
banks that have had the most extensive purchase programmes.
ECB’s monetary policy target is to keep inflation rate near but under 2%. To achieve
this, ECB uses different kind of monetary policy measures. ECB’s so-called conven-
tional monetary policy measures are main refinancing operations and interest rate
for marginal lending facility and deposit facility. Marginal lending facility interest
rate is the rate that banks have to pay to get overnight credit from ECB. Deposit
facility interest rate is the rate that banks get for their overnight deposits at ECB.
These two rates set a corridor to the market interest rates. The marginal lending fa-
cility rate is the ceiling rate for euro area overnight credit. Banks do not take credit
from the markets with higher interest rate than the ECB’s marginal lending rate,
because they always have the option to take overnight credit from ECB with the
marginal lending rate. The deposit rate is the floor rate for euro area overnight de-
posits. Banks do not deposit money with smaller interest rate than the deposit rate,
because they can always deposit the money to the central bank with the deposit rate.
Main refinancing operations (MROs) are in the normal financial situation the main
liquidity provider for the euro area banking system. Technically MRO is a liquidity-
4
providing reverse transaction. Practically MRO is credit from ECB to banks for
one week against sufficient collateral. Before the financial crisis, the MROs were
distributed so, that ECB set the minimum rate and the total amount of credit to be
distributed. After that, the banks were able to leave tenders about that included how
much they want credit and on what price. The MRO credit was allocated based
on these tenders. Currently, ECB is practising a fixed-rate full-allotment policy.
That means, that ECB has defined the rate for MRO (currently1 0,00%) and banks
choose how much they want to lend with the predetermined rate. The frequency
for MRO is still one week. Besides the MROs, ECB has also other open market
operations with longer maturity. Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) have
a maturity of three months. The 3-month LTROs are organized monthly. ECB can
also conduct fine-tuning operations and structural operations when they find the
need.
ECB’s interest rate based monetary policy is not a peculiarity. Before the financial
crisis, interest rates were the most effective and most used monetary policy instru-
ment. Problems arose when interest rates started to approach zero and the economic
activity was still in unusually low level. Central banks reacted by introducing dif-
ferent kind of unconventional monetary policies that often included central bank’s
balance sheet. Borio & Diyatat (2010) call these kind of policies balance sheet
policies. They divide balance sheet policies to four different categories: exchange
rate policy, quasi-debt management policy, credit policy and bank reserves policy.
By purchasing assets from the private sector, the central bank practices quasi-debt
management policy, credit policy, bank reserves policy or mixture of these policies
depending on the targeted assets. They also point out that one of the good qualities
of different kind of balance sheet policies is that they can be implemented separately
1July 2017
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from the interest rate policy. Stone et al. (2011) use a different kind of classification
of balance sheet policies. They divide policies to financial stability and macroeco-
nomic stability policies.
The purchase programmes have become a common monetary policy tool in the recent
years. Gambacorta et al. (2014) even states that the central bank balance sheets
have replaced interest rates as the main monetary policy instrument. The general
idea of a asset purchase programme is to operate directly on different segments of
the asset’s yield curve and reduce interest rates at different maturities (Chen et al.,
2012). By purchasing assets, the central bank can affect the private sector balance
sheets. The central bank can also provide liquidity to the malfunctioning parts of
the financial markets. Providing liquidity has an important role, because stressed
financial markets can jeopardize the activity of the real market. (Stone et al., 2011).
Asset purchase programmes can affect the economy through different transmission
channels. Some of the channels are described in chapter 3.
ECB is one of the central banks that have introduced new unconventional monetary
policy instruments after the financial crisis. When the key monetary policy interest
rates hit the zero lower bound, ECB needed to find new ways to ensure the price
stability and the liquidity in the banking system. The unconventional monetary
policy measures of ECB are extended asset purchase programme (APP or EAPP
in some literature), LTROs with longer maturity than the the original 3 months,
targeted longer term refinancing operations (TLTROs), forward guidance and the
expansion of the list of collateral eligible for the credit operations.
When executing the asset purchase programmes, ECB buys public and private sec-
tor assets monthly with predefined amount. ECB’s current extended asset purchase
6
programme (APP) consists four different purchase programmes. These four pur-
chase programmes are: third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), asset-
backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP), public sector purchase programme
(PSPP) and corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP). ECB has executed also
three already terminated purchase programmes: covered bond purchase programme
(CBPP), covered bond purchase programme 2 (CBPP2) and Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP).
ECB expanded its asset purchase programmes to puclic sector bonds in the begin-
ning of 2015 when it introduced the PSPP. The main goal of the expanded asset
programme was and still is to prevent the inflation from getting too low for too
long period. Figure 1 represents the cumulative Eurosystem holdings of assets un-
der different purchase programmes. PSPP is definitely ECB’s largest programme
measured in purchase volumes. The current purchase programmes are continued at
least until the end of 2017 with a monthly amount of 60 billion euros. The APP
and TLTROs together form an unconventional monetary package of ECB.
The oldest ones of the ECB’s current purchase programmes are third covered bond
purchase programme (CBPP3) and asset-backed securities purchase programme
(ABSPP). Both programmes were announced on October 20142. In its decision
ECB/2014/40 to start the CBPP3, ECB states that the CBPP3 (together with
ABSPP and TLTROs) will ”futher enhance the transmission of monetary policy,
facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy, generate positive spillovers to
other markets and, as a result, ease ECB’s monetary policy stance, and contribute
to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to 2 %.”. ECB buys under both pro-
grammes a different form of securitisated assets. Central bank purchases gives banks
2See decisions ECB/2014/40 and ECB/2014/45.
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Figure 1: Eurosystem holdings under the APP
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an incentive to back their assets and sell them to central bank3.
ECB announced the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) on January 2015
and started the purchases on the following March. The PSPP expanded the before
mentioned ABSPP and CBPP3 to cover also euro area government, agency and EU
institution bonds. (Andrade et al., 2016). The announcement day of the PSPP is
considered in the literature to be the birth date of the whole extended asset pur-
chase programme (APP). This means that the CBPP3 and ABSPP are parts of the
APP even though they were introduced before the start of the APP. On its decision
(ECB/2015/10) ECB states that the motive for starting PSPP is to maintain price
stability. The PSPP covers nominal and inflation-linked central government bonds
and also bonds issued by recognised agencies, regional and local governments, inter-
national organisations and multilateral development banks located in the euro area.
Purchased bonds can have a negative yield as long as the yield is above the deposit
facility rate. Some of the assets that are bought under the PSPP are available for
securities lending to ensure the liquidity of purchased assets. (ECB/2015/10).
Latest addition to ECB’s purchase programmes is the corporate sector purchase
programme (CSPP). The programme was announced on 10th of March 2016. On
the press release Mario Draghi said that ”the CSPP will provide further monetary
policy accommodation and contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels below,
but close to, 2% in the medium term”. CSPP expanded the previous asset purchase
programmes by starting the purchases of corporate bonds. The purchases under
the programme started on the 8th of June 2016. CSPP is a very recent programme
and because of that, it is the least studied of the ECB’s purchase programmes. The
main goal of my thesis is to assess the possible effects and transmission channels of
3According to Duca et al. (2016) Fed’s QE has increased the corporate bond issuance globally.
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the CSPP.
The eligibility criteria of the CSPP is based on the Eurosystem’s collateral frame-
work, just like in all of the other ECB’s purchase programmes. If the asset does not
fulfil all of the collateral eligibility criteria4, it can not be purchased under ECBs
purchase programmes. Collateral framework defines what kind of assets are eligible
as collateral for Eurosystems monetary policy operations. Assets with any kind of
complex structure are not allowed. Eligible assets need to have fixed and uncondi-
tional principal, meaning that for example assets with equity-linked or any kind of
conditional principal are non-eligible. The coupon structure of the assets needs to
be simple and easily determined. Coupon can be either fixed, zero, multi-step or
floating, bound by one of the accepted reference rates. Besides the principal and
coupon structure, eligibility criteria defines also requirements for the status of the
assets. Eligible asset need to have a senior status, meaning that it is not subordi-
nated to the rights of other assets of the same issuer.
To be eligible, asset5 needs to have an Investment Grade credit rating6. The credit
rating of the asset is the primary rating to be used, but if it is does not exist, then the
issuers credit rating can be used. If the asset or the issuer does have a feasible credit
rating, then the guarantor’s credit rating is used. If the asset has several accept-
able7 ratings different for each other, the best one is used. To be eligible, the asset
needs to be admitted to trading on one of the acceptable markets. ECB publishes
a list of acceptable markets as well as all of the eligible assets on its website regularly.
4Collateral eligibility criteria is defined on Guideline (EU) 2015/510.
5or the issuer or guarantor of the asset
6Credit rating of at least BBB-.
7Eurosystem approves ratings from the following rating agencies: Moodys, S&P, Fitch and
DBRS.
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Besides the collateral eligibility criteria, there is also specific criteria that assets
need to fulfil before they can be purchased under CSPP. The purchased bonds need
to be euro-denominated bonds and have a maturity between six months and under
31 years. Low minimum maturity ensures that corporate bonds issued by small
companies can be bought to the programme. Purchasable bonds need to be issued
by non-financial corporations and they are not allowed to have a parent company
that is a financial corporation. Purchased bonds can be bought from the primary
or secondary markets, with certain purchase limits. The purchases are done by six
national central banks (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Finland). Each
of the central banks have their own set of countries, whose bond market issues they
are responsible for. (ECB 2016/16).
Financial crisis have forced central banks to use their creativity and implement new
monetary policy measures. Central banks have attacked the protracted economic
situation with different kind on liquidity inserting operations and extensive asset
purchase programmes. Market has been very sensitive to the announcement and
even exact wordings of the central banks and the importance of thorough forward
guidance has become an important part of the monetary policy.
11
3 Review of Previous Literature
Studies regarding the asset purchase programme has increased in the 2000s and in
the 2010s. The start of the extensive asset purchase programmes of Japan, the Fed,
Bank of England and ECB has increased the demand for research on purchase pro-
grammes, their effects on macroeconomic variables and their transmission channels.
With no doubt the Fed’s QE has been researched more than any other central bank’s
programmes. However, there exist a large amount of studies regarding other central
bank’s programmes. The studies of the benefits of the asset purchase programmes
usually agree with the effect of the programme and disagree with the magnitude and
persistence. Event study is a common method used but also different kind of vector
autoregression models have been conducted (SVAR and BVAR). Gertler & Karadi
(2013) have developed a theoretical model to study the purchase programmes. Sev-
eral possible transmission channels regarding the purchase programmes exist. In
this chapter, I will introduce the most common ones.
Asset purchase programmes were studied in a theoretical perspective even before
they were implemented. According to Chen et al. (2012), before the asset purchase
programmes were implemented, they were criticised from a theoretical perspective.
These critiques were based on the irrelevance result in Wallace (1981). Also, if as-
set purchase programmes are examined in a New Keynesian model of Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), the asset purchase programmes are completely ineffective.
Exchanging reserve injections to assets would be a neutral operation in this frame-
work. (Chen et al., 2012) Clouse et al. (2000) examines what could be the possible
monetary policy tools when nominal short-term interest rate is close to zero. Their
study is focused on the US and the monetary policy choices of Fed. They find out
that Fed can stimulate the economy with Treasury purchases when stimulus created
by lowering the interest rate is not enough.
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”An event study looks at the reaction of the financial markets to news.” (Gu¨rkaynak
& Wright, 2013). Event study is a popular method for studying the immediate effect,
that the announcement of some event, had in the financial markets. I concentrate on
studies that use the announcement of the asset purchase programme as their event.
Most of these kind of studies examine the effect of programme announcement to bond
yields8, but also the announcement effects of equity prices9 and interest rates10 have
been studied. The bonds whose yields are being studied are usually the ones that
are purchased under the programme in question. This means that several studies
regarding ECB’s or Bank of England’s purchase programmes use government bond
yields as their dependent variable. Studies regarding the Federal Reserve’s purchase
programmes study the effect of the programme announcement on Treasury yields or
Mortgage-Backed Security yields, depending on the programme being studied.
Results of the event studies are unanimous that the announcement of purchase pro-
gramme lowered bond yields. The time that the effect took to take place and the
level varies between studies. This was due the fact that different programmes affect
the yields through different transmission channels. The financial situations were
not fully homogeneous in the US, UK and Europe on the time of the programme
announcements. Altavilla et al. (2015) points out that the programmes that were
started right after the collapse of Lehman Brothers had larger effects, because they
were implemented on a much more turbulent financial situation. Other varying thing
between the event studies is the time between the announcement and the yield re-
action. Liquid bond market reacts very fast to new market information. However,
8See Altavilla et al. (2015), Altavilla & Giannone (2016), Altavilla et al. (2016), Andrade et
al. (2016), D’Amico & King (2013), Falagiarda & Reitz (2015), D’Amico et al. (2012), Joyce &
Tong (2012), and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
9See Haitsma et al. (2016) and Bernanke & Kuttner (2005)
10See Gagnon et al. (2010)
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purchase programmes have been introduced in times, when the bond market has
not been very liquid. Joyce & Tong (2012) point out, that it is possible that the
announcement effects have taken even days to occur when the Bank of England’s
first asset purchase programme was announced11.
Usually yields of the bonds that were eligible for purchased had significant announce-
ment effects. Nevertheless, some studies argue that the effects were persistent and
others doubt that. Andrade et al. (2016) points out, that the decrease in sovereign
bond yields12 after ECB’s announcement of the PSPP was equally persistent, than
the change caused by a policy rate change. They found out that the announcement
of the PSPP decreased bond yields by 12 basis points and the implementation of the
programme decreased yields for additional 14 basis points. Altavilla et al. (2015)
studied also the effects of PSPP announcement on bond yields. On their study, the
announcement decreased bond yields by 30-50 basis points, depending on the length
of the event window. Martin & Milas (2012) state that even though Fed’s and Bank
of England’s programmes decreased yields, the yields rose later back to their previ-
ous levels. They state that this may mean, that either the effect was not persistent,
or another force has larger effects to yields. In addition, some programmes had spill
over effects to yields of bonds that were not purchased.
In addition to event studies, vector autoregression models have been used to study
the effects of purchase programmes. Studies13 show that the purchase programmes
had a positive impact on economic output and prices. Altavilla et al. (2016) studied
the effects of ECB’s announcement of OMT programme. They found out that the
announcement had a positive impact on credit and economic growth in Spain and
11In the beginning of 2009
12They studied the effects of Italy’s and Germany’s sovereign bond yields
13See Kapetanios et al. (2012), Schenkelberg & Watzka (2012), Wieladek & Pascual (2016) and
Weale & Wieladek (2016).
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Italy. Wieladek & Pascual (2016) noticed that the output effects were larger in the
UK and US than in Europe.
Studies have found evidence of several transmission channels through which the
purchase programmes have affected the economy. The active transmission channels
depend on the qualities of the bonds being purchased and the prevailing financial
situation. The channels that are found effective most often are the portfolio bal-
ancing channel14 and signalling channel. The terminology used when assessing the
transmission channels is quite mixed and the same channel can have different name
in different studies. Also the hierarchy of different channels and its subchannels
varies between studies.
Altavilla et al. (2015) state that the transmission channels of purchase programmes
can be divided into ”broad channels” and ”narrow channels” based on the amount
of spillovers that the programme has to market segments other than the targeted
ones. Usually the studies that use event study as their methodology are divided so,
that the announcement effect on yields is studied first and after that the possible
transmission channels are being studied separately after that. Weale & Wieladek
(2016) point out that when using a structural VAR-model, the possible transmission
channel’s contributions can not be directly estimated.
Portfolio rebalancing channel is the channel that comes up in almost every study
regarding the asset purchase programmes. Portfolio rebalancing means that when
the central bank purchases assets from the private sector, and by doing so, it re-
places the purchased assets with less-risky, short-term bank reserves. Therefore, the
central bank reduces the risk borne by the private sector. The private sector is not
14Sometimes referred also as asset valuation channel. See Andrade et al. (2016).
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willing to sell their assets to central bank, if the expected return of the asset does not
decrease. This leads to increase in the asset’s price and decrease of yield. (Gagnon
et al., 2010). Studies15 found evidence supporting the portfolio rebalancing chan-
nel, but they differ on the risk type that is reduced during the purchases. Portfolio
rebalancing channel is usually divided into different subchannels, the most common
ones being duration risk channel and local supply channel.
Duration risk is one type of risk, that the central bank can reduce by purchasing
bonds from the private sector. Bonds with long duration are more sensitive to the
possible changes in the interest rate, than the shorter ones. Bonds’ risk premium
increases if there is an increase in the expected policy rate. This means that if an
investor buys long maturity bond with interest rate x, he takes a risk that the pol-
icy rate will increase during the bond’s maturity and that he would have had larger
profit from somewhere else. Central bank purchases lower private sector’s duration
risk and give them an opportunity to take more risk with some other asset types.
This can cause spillover to other assets than the ones that were originally purchased
under the programme.
The magnitude of effects of the duration risk channel depend on the assets that the
central bank purchases. If the central bank purchases risky assets, the effect to the
economy through duration risk channel is larger. Risky asset is an asset that has
a long maturity and/or counterparty risk. (Andrade et al., 2016). Duration risk
is usually studied by examining the differences of yield changes on programme an-
nouncement dates between different bond maturities. If the yield decrease is larger
on long maturities, that may be caused by decreased duration risk. Studies have
found evidence supporting duration risk in ECB’s PSPP (Andrade et al. (2016)),
15See Clouse et al. (2000), Altavilla et al. (2015), Gagnon et al. (2010) and (2011), Joyce et al.
(2011)
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FED’s LSAP1 and LSAP2 (D’Amico et al. (2012), D’Amico & King (2013)), Bank
of England’s QE (Joyce & Tong (2012)). There is also some theoretical models
describing the duration risk channel. The most used one is from Vayanos & Vila
(2009)16.
Other form of portfolio rebalancing channel is the local supply channel17. Altavilla
et al. (2015) states that if the arbitrageurs in the market are extremely risk-averse,
they will not purchase riskier assets to replace the ones bought by central bank.
Instead, they will buy only assets with same maturity than the ones purchased un-
der the purchase programme. This will cause the yields to decrease more on the
assets that have same maturity as the ones purchased by the central bank. Local
supply channel causes also a yield decrease of assets that are not being purchased,
but have same maturity structure than the purchased assets. (Altavilla et al., 2015).
Local supply channel are found to be stronger in a more segmented markets (Eser
& Schwaab, 2013).
Central bank’s monetary policy changes gives a signal to the market about possible
future policy changes. This is called the signalling effect. When the central banks
announces a purchase programme, it gives a signal to the market that it will not
increase the policy rate right away. When central bank is buying large amount of
assets with long duration, it exposes itself to the risk of losses if the policy rate would
increase during the maturity of the bonds. This gives creditability for the central
bank to keep the policy rate low for longer. (Andrade et al., 2016). Studies regard-
ing the purchase programmes found evidence supporting the signalling channel18,
16The model of Vayanos & Vila (2009) has also inspired different kind of extensions and simpli-
fications. See for example Altavilla et al. (2015) and Doh (2010).
17Local supply channel is also called asset scarcity channel in some studies.
18See Andrade et al. (2016), Christensen & Rudebusch (2012), Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgenssen (2011), Wieladek & Pascual (2016) and D’Amico et al. (2012).
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but there is also some studies that could not find the signalling channel significant
(Weale & Wieladek (2016)).
There is also several other possible transmission channels for purchase programmes.
However the portfolio rebalancing channel and signalling channel are the most com-
mon ones. Purchase programmes can also affect the economy by increasing liquidity
in the market (liquidity channel), increasing banks’ lending to the public (credit
channel), reanchoring markets long-term inflation expectations (reanchoring or in-
flation channel), providing capital relief for banks (capital relief channel) or reducing
the risk of bondholder paying the asset back before it matures (prepayment risk)19.
Asset purchase programmes have become more common in the 21st century as new
central banks have started asset purchases. Literature regarding the effects of these
kind of policy actions has also increased during the past 10 years. Literature re-
garding purchase programmes is quite unanimous about the effects, but disagrees on
the magnitude and persistence. Some of the purchases programmes were introduced
in very turbulent financial market situation and that may have further accelerated
the results. Purchases affect the economy through different transmission channels.
The most common channels are portfolio rebalancing channel, duration risk channel,
local supply channel and signalling channel.
19The prepayment risk arises when the purchased securities have an option to be paid premature.
Gabaix et al. (2007) and Stroebel & Taylor (2016) studied the prepayment risk on US housing
market and they noticed that the risk of mortgage owners prepaying their loans was prices in the
mortgage-backed securities market.
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4 Empirical Strategy
In the empirical part of my thesis I study the immediate effect that CSPP related
announcements had on bond yields and the possible transmission mechanisms. Be-
sides the yield effect, I also study the possible changes on interest rate expectations
on event dates to determine whether the signalling channel is active. I use event
study to examine the yield reactions of two bond indexes and the price reactions of
interest rate swap contracts. I also use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
conducted by ECB, to study the possible changes in interest rate expectations of
the forecasters before and after the CSPP announcement.
Several studies regarding asset purchase programmes use event study, when assessing
the effect of the policy announcement to financial variables (usually bond or trea-
sury yields). Gu¨rkaynak and Wright (2013) describe thoroughly the methodology
of event studies. They state, that the key ingredients for a successful event study is
that the researcher is able to measure the event that changes the information set of
market participant and the effect of the changed information set on relevant asset
prices. Altavilla and Giannone (2016) state that event study is a powerful tool for
quantifying the immediate market effect of policy. The hypothesis of event studies
is that the new information gained from the policy announcement is immediately
absorbed into financial asset prices. (Altavilla & Giannone, 2016)
Even though the event study methodology is an effect tool, it has some weaknesses.
Altavilla and Giannone (2016) point out, that the shortcoming of the event study
methodology is that it is not very effective for assessing the persistence of policy ef-
fects. In the event studies the purchasable bonds’ yields are studied before and after
the announcement. The length of the event window20 used in the studies varies from
20Event window is the period of time being investigated in the event studies. Small window helps
19
one hour to two days, depending on the liquidity of the market being investigated.
Larger event windows have been used, especially on the studies regarding the US
bond market during the start of financial crisis, when the markets were under a lot
of stress and the liquidity in the market was low.
I want to compare the yield changes on announcement dates of bonds that are eligible
for CSPP purchases and the ones that are not, to see whether there is any spillover
effect to non-purchasable bonds. The difficulty of the bond selection is that even
though a list of individual bonds eligible for purchases is publicly available, there is
not an index that contains just all the CSPP eligible bonds and nothing else. To solve
the preceding, I decided to study the effects of the CSPP related announcement on
two bond indexes: EUR Investment Grade European Corporate Bond Index (later
IG Index) and EUR High Yield Corporate Bond Index (later HY Index). These two
indexes have very similar characteristics. The main difference between the indexes
is the credit rating of the bonds included. The IG Index consists only bonds that
have at least BBB- rating. If the rating is worse than that, the bond is included in
the HY Index.
Why does the credit rating of the bonds matter? Bond needs to have at least BBB-
rating to be eligible for the CSPP purchases. Because of that, all CSPP eligible
bonds are included in the IG Index. The IG Index also includes non-eligible bonds
that are close substitutes to the eligible ones. On the contrary, the HY Index does
not include any CSPP eligible bonds. The contents of both indexes are described in
more detail on chapter 5. I chose to use time period of 1st of April 2015 to 9th of
June 2017 in my study. ECB announced the PSPP on January 2015 and that have
to rule out possible other things that might affected the yields besides the policy announcement.
Nevertheless, the event window need to be vast enough to cover the possible effects that are not
immediate.
20
affected the bond yields. I do not want to include the PSPP announcement on the
time period of my study about the CSPP, because I want to be able to separate the
effects of different programmes as accurate as possible.
I follow Altavilla and Giannone (2016) and Altavilla et al. (2015) in the empirical
part of my thesis and use the following regression when studying the yield effects of
the CSPP related announcements:
∆yt =
k∑
j=1
λjDj,t +
m∑
s=1
δsNewss,t + t (1)
Where ∆yt is the change of the yield of the bond index on day t. Yield change in
day t is calculated as a difference between the end of day yields of day t and t− 1. I
have chosen not to include a constant term into the regression. Figures 3 and 4 show
no trend during my time frame. I also tested the regression with a constant term
and the estimate for the constant was very close to zero. Different from Altavilla
and Giannone (2016), I have chosen to use one day event window, because bond
market has been quite liquid during the studied time period.
Dt is a dummy variable for the CSPP related announcement dates. Dt is equal to
1 on event dates21 and 0 otherwise. I have chosen event dates to be such dates
on which ECB either announced something regarding the CSPP or hinted about
a possible extension of the existing pre-CSPP programmes. I used transcripts of
ECB’s press releases and Google trends when determining the event dates. The
press releases of ECB’s Governing Council monetary policy meeting are built so,
21All the event dates are listed in the Appendix A.
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that first they announce the monetary policy decisions made and after that is a
Q&A section, where Governing Council’s president Mario Draghi answers questions
from the press. Draghi’s comments on the Q&A have occasionally hinted about
possible future monetary policy decisions, even though the monetary policy rates
would have been kept the same in that meeting.
Newss,t measures the effect caused by other macroeconomic releases that could have
influenced the bond indexes besides the CSPP announcement. Both the IG and HY
Index are sensitive to changes in economic conditions. Therefore, it is essential to
rule out possible other things that may have affected the indexes. The Newss,t is
constructed so, that every day t that a new value of variable s is announced, the
value of Newss,t is equal to the difference between the latest survey value of s and
the actual announced value. All the days, that there is no announcement for s, the
value of Newss,t is zero. If the announced value of s is the same that the value of the
latest survey, the value of Newss,t is also zero. This is the exactly same approach
that Altavilla et al. (2015) use.
I will follow Altavilla et al. (2015) regarding the variables chosen to be included
in the Newss,t, because similar to me Altavilla et al. (2015) study ECB’s purchase
programmes and the effects of purchase programmes related policy announcements
on European bond market. Altavilla et al. (2015) use 40 different macroeconomic
variables in their Newss,t. I started with the same set of variables, but I ended
up dropping a couple of them out, because there were no surprise element in these
variables during the whole event window. All of their releases were fully anticipated
by the market and because of that, the value of Newss,t of those particular variables
for 0 for every t. I also added two variables: price of oil and change in the difference
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of Eonia22 and ECB’s deposit rate. Newss,t contains macroeconomic variables for
euro area, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the US. All the data is collected from
Bloomberg.
Besides the immediate yield effects, I study the possible transmission channels. I use
similar approach as Andrade et al. (2016) and estimate the yield effect of IG and HY
Index with different maturities. If the portfolio rebalancing channel, and especially
the duration risk channel is active, the CSPP related announcements should have
caused a spillover to bonds that are not purchased, in my case the HY Index bonds.
If the yields have decreased more for bonds with long maturities, the local supply
channel is active. I will also use interest rate swap contracts and ECB’s SPF to
determine whether the signalling channel is active. Both are effective tools to deter-
mine interest rate expectations and the changes that CSPP related announcement
had on them.
Interest rate swap contract is a derivative contract where one party agrees to pay
pre-determined fixed interest date and another one pays floating interest rate. The
reference rate for floating rate part of the contract and settlement date is decided
beforehand. On the settlement date only the difference between floating and fixed
rate is paid between the counterparties. When the interest rates are expected to
rise, the prices of the interest rate swap contracts also rises and vice-versa. Following
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), I use interest rate swaps with different
contract maturities on my study to determine how CSPP related announcements af-
fected the interest rate expectations. The reference rate for one day maturity swap
is Eonia and for all the other maturities the reference rate is the 6 month Euribor.
I will use the following regression when studying the effects of CSPP related an-
22Eonia means Euro OverNight Index Average and it is the rate of euro area overnight interbank
credit.
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nouncements to interest rate swap prices:
pt =
k∑
j=1
λjDj,t +
m∑
s=1
δsNewss,t + t (2)
The regression is similar to the regression I use when studying the yield effects. pt
is the price of swap contract on day t. Similarly to the yield model, I have also
chosen not to include a constant term into the regression. Set of event dates Dj,t
is the same as in the yield study23. Newss,t is also otherwise the same as in the
yield study, but I have excluded the difference of ECB deposit rate and EONIA24.
I will examine the effects of the announcement on prices of contracts with different
maturities to determine the magnitude of the possible signalling effect.
Other way to measure the changes in interest rate expectations is to examine the
results of ECB’s SPF (survey of professional forecasters). Andrade et al. (2016)
used SPF to determine how the announcement of PSPP affected the interest rate
forecasts. I study how the forecasters revised their survey answers regarding ECB’s
future policy rate on the survey done after the CSPP announcement. SPF is collected
four times a year, and I will be particularly interested on the survey made before
and after ECB announced that it will start the CSPP.
23Descriptions of event dates are describes on Appendix A.
24Full list of contents of Newss,t is described on Appendix B.
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5 Description of Data
I study the reaction of yields of corporate bonds and prices of interest rate swap con-
tracts to the announcements of ECB’s CSPP. I will examine yields of two different
bond indexes. My study also includes a set of macroeconomic variables that may
have influenced the bond yields and swap prices. Data regarding the bond yields,
interest swap contract prices and other macroeconomic variables is collected from
Bloomberg. The yield I have chosen for my study is the Yield to Maturity. Yield
to Maturity is the expected return that the bondholder would get, if he holds the
bond until maturity. The frequency of my yield data is daily and the values are the
business day’s last yield25. The price data for interest rate swap contracts is also
the EOD-price from each day.
The two indexes that I am using in the yield study are EUR Investment Grade
European Corporate Bond Index (IG Index) and EUR High Yield Corporate Bond
Index (HY Index). Figures 2 and 3 describe the evolution of yields of both indexes.
The announcement date of the CSPP and the dates when ECB announced details
of the programme and started the purchases26 are marked in the figures with grey
dotted lines. Both indexes contain euro-denominated corporate bonds that are is-
sued in the European bond market. All the bonds included in the IG Index have
a Investment-Grade credit rating. This means that they have at least the rating
BBB-. On the contrary, all the bonds included in the HY Index, have a High-Yield
level of credit rating, meaning that they have worse rating than BBB-.
Table 1 summarises the contents of the yield data. The yields are calculated for the
whole index, bonds with maturities from 1 to 5 years, bonds with maturities from
25so called EndOfDay or EOD-value
2610 March 2016, 21 April 2016, 2 June 2016 and 8 June 2016.
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5 to 10 years and bond with maturity over 10 years. The HY Index is more volatile
and has larger yields in all maturities than the IG Index. The bonds included in the
HY Index have worse credit rating than the bonds in the IG Index and because of
that, the HY Index bonds have larger risk of default and therefore their bonds have
larger interest rates. Both indexes are rules-based, market-value weighted indexes.
Both indexes consist bonds that have a fixed interest rate, are issued in European
bond market and are denominated in euro.
Table 1: Summary of yields of IG and HY Index
Index N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
IG (all maturities) 572 0.886 0.261 0.411 1.404
IG (1-5 years) 572 0.467 0.224 0.108 0.950
IG (5-10 years) 572 1.164 0.310 0.548 1.738
IG (over 10 years) 572 1.831 0.395 1.062 2.507
HY (all maturities) 572 4.317 0.757 3.234 6.470
HY (1-5 years) 572 4.147 0.811 3.170 6.712
HY (5-10 years) 572 4.538 0.743 3.258 6.480
HY (over 10 years) 572 4.595 0.328 3.888 5.527
Table 2 describes the sector distribution of the issuers included in the indexes.
Largest sectors in the IG Indexes are financials, utilities, communications and con-
sumer discretionary. IG Index with larger maturity have less financial sector bonds
and more industrial sector bonds than the shorter ones. It need to be noted here,
that the bonds issued by financial institutions are not eligible for CSPP purchases.
Because the index also consists ineligible bonds, the possible effects of the CSPP
announcement on the IG Index yields might be smaller, than they would be if the
index would consist only eligible bonds. Sector distribution in the HY Index is
more evenly distributed27. The largest sectors are communications, consumer dis-
27Apart from the HY Index with bonds that have maturity over 10 years.
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cretionary, financials, industrials and materials. The bonds in the HY Index have
much shorter maturity in general than the ones in IG Index. Because of that, the
HY Index with the maturity of over 10 years does not include as many bonds as the
rest of the indexes. Bonds with High Yield credit rating are more risky and used
to earn higher profit than the ones with an Investment Grade credit rating. The
demand for long term bond with High Yield credit rating might be low and because
of that the bonds issued do not have very long maturities.
Both the HY and IG Index includes only bonds that are issued in the European
bond market. Nevertheless the residency of the issuer can be a country outside
Europe. Table 2 describes the most common issuer countries for bonds with different
maturities in the IG Index and table 3 for bonds in the HY Index. Both indexes
have similar set of issuer countries, but with different shares. IG Index is more
concentrated than the HY Index. Half of the issuers in the IG Index are residents
of France, United States or Germany.
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Table 3: Issuer country distribution of IG Index
Country IG (all) IG (1-5) IG (5-10) IG (over 10)
1 FRANCE 24.60 20.80 27.60 30.40
2 UNITED STATES 17.20 12.10 20.80 27.80
3 GERMANY 12.60 14.70 10.40 12.60
4 UNITED KINGDOM 8.70 9.70 8.40 5.30
5 ITALY 6.30 8.00 5.30 2.40
6 NETHERLANDS 5.60 6.40 5.30 2.50
Table 4: Issuer country distribution of HY Index
Country HY (all) HY (1-5) HY (5-10) HY (over 10)
1 ITALY 18.90 22.00 14.20 34.60
2 FRANCE 12.60 11.70 13.90 11.60
3 UNITED STATES 11.50 5.60 19.40 0.00
4 GERMANY 11.30 12.80 9.60 8.20
5 UNITED KINGDOM 10.50 12.40 8.30 9.80
6 LUXEMBOURG 6.10 6.60 5.30 8.70
Besides the yield effect, I study the effect of CSPP related announcements to prices
of interest rate swap contracts and ECB’s SPF results. Prices of interest rate swap
contracts are collected from Bloomberg for different maturity contracts. The data
includes daily EOD prices. Data for ECB’s SPF is collected from the ECB’s Sta-
tistical Data Warehouse. The survey is done quarterly and ECB publishes the data
on forecaster-level and also the aggregated forecasts. ECB’s SPF measures the fore-
casters assumptions of future inflation, GDP and unemployment rate. It also collect
the forecasts for ECB’s policy rate, oil prices, USD/EUR exchange rate and labour
costs. All of the forecasts are collected for different horizons. I am particularly
interested on the forecast for ECB’s interest rate and especially how it have changed
after the announcement of the CSPP.
I include a set of macroeconomic variables in my regressions to rule out other pos-
sible things affecting the bond yields besides the CSPP related policy announce-
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ments. I follow Altavilla et al. (2015) with the selection of these macroeconomic
variables. I collect different kind of macroeconomic variables (for example price in-
dices, employment rates and consumer confidence indexes) for the whole euro area,
the United States, Italy, Spain, Germany and France. All the used variables and
their Bloomberg tickers are listed in the Appendix B.
I am interested for the surprise effect of these variables and because of that I create
a surprise component (Newst in my regression) of all these variables. I do this by
comparing the announcement value of each variable to its latest survey value. If the
announcement have been fully anticipated by the market, the survey value is equal
to the actual announcement value and then the announcement should not have any
effect to the bond yields. The variables have a value of zero for all the days when
there was no announcement made. I started with the same variable set than Altavilla
et al. (2015), but some of the variables had to be dropped out, because they did not
have any surprise announcements. This meaning that the difference between latest
survey value and the announcement value for zero for the whole period of interest.
I also include two additional variables: the change of difference between Eonia and
ECB’s deposit rate and the change in oil price.
All the data ranges from April 2015 to June 2017. The period is chosen so that
possible other purchase programme announcements will not affect the results. Es-
pecially the announcement of ECB’s PSPP28 needs to be excluded from the data
period. Event dates are all the dates the Governing Council of ECB announced
the CSPP or additional details regarding the programme and different dates when
the ECB hinted about possible extension of the purchase programmes. Detailed
descriptions of the selected dates are described in Appendix A.
28Announcement date for the PSPP was 21st of January 2015.
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6 Results
I start the empirical part of my thesis by determining the event dates. I use ECB
Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions and Google Trends data when decid-
ing the set of event dates. After the selection of event dates, I study how the yields
of two bond indexes reacted on event dates. I examine if there is differences in the
yield reaction between the two indexes and between different maturities. Besides
the yield effects, I also study how the CSPP announcements affected interest rate
expectations. I study the interest rate expectations by examining the changes of
prices of interest rate swaps on event dates and the changes on interest rate expec-
tations in the ECB’s SPF before and after the announcement of the CSPP.
First step during my research is to choose the set of event dates. Markets can pre-
dict the upcoming monetary policy decisions in advance and start to change their
behaviour already before the actual policy announcements. It is important, to deter-
mine the possible event dates as accurate as possible, otherwise some of the possible
effects may not be accounted for. I started my set of event dates with the actual
Governing Council announcement dates29 of the CSPP programme. I used the tran-
scripts of ECB’s Governing Council’s Press Releases to choose the dates that ECB
announced something regarding the CSPP.
I also study what have been the days during which the people have been the most
interested about the ECB’s Quantitative Easing by using Google Trends. Google
Trends shows data about Google searches done by people around the world. Figure
2910th of March 2016, 21st of April 2016, 2nd of June 2016 and 8th of June 2016
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4 describes the Google searches done using search words ”ECB QE” and ”CSPP”
during 1st of April 2015 and 9th of June 2017. I have marked the dates that I use
in my set of event dates into the figure with grey vertical lines. Google Trends data
is normalized, meaning that the date with a largest amount of searches has a value
of 100. Figure 4 shows that during my research period, the most searches were done
on the date when ECB announced that it will start a new purchase programme for
corporate sector bonds on 10th of March 2016. There was an increased amount of
searches done before almost every ECB Governing Council’s meeting and also on
the dates when there were interviews of ECB officials in the media. Figure 4 shows,
that market was excepting an QE announcement from the ECB at the Governing
Council’s meeting on 3rd of December 2015, there is a large spike on that day on
the Google searches. Full list of event dates I use and their descriptions are listed
in Appendix A.
OLS estimates for changes of IG and HY Indexes yields on event dates are described
in Table 5. The estimates are calculated for the IG and HY Indexes with all bond
maturities. Columns 1 and 2 contain estimates with unrestricted regression30 and
columns 3 and 4 with restriction. On event dates, the yield of IG Index decreased
by 1.2 basis points and the yield of HY Index decreased by 2.4 basis points. When
the other possible macroeconomic variables are taken into account, the yield of IG
Index decreased for 1.3 basis points and the estimate of yield of HY Index stayed
the same as for the unrestricted one. Both estimates have higher significance levels
with the restricted model.
Residuals of the restricted model with IG and HY Index data31 are described on
Appendix C. If the model fits the data well, the residuals should be approximately
30without Newss,t
31Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5
34
 Figure 4: Google searches
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white noise. By visually inspecting the residuals, I can say that the IG Index resid-
uals are approximately white noise with for 2 outliers. The residuals of HY Index
have larger variance on some points. I also checked the possible heteroscedasticity
of the residuals with Breusch-Pagan test that confirmed my visual inspection: there
is heteroscedasticity in the residuals for HY Index. I also check the residuals for
possible autocorrelation. I did the Durbin-Watson test to the model and find out
that there is autocorrelation in the residuals of both indexes. Q-Q plot in Appendix
C shows that the residuals of IG Index are more normally distributed than the resid-
uals of HY Index.
Because of the heteroscedasticity, I chose to use the Newey-West standard errors.
The estimation for Table 5 and all the other OLS estimates in this thesis include
Newey-West standard errors. I test the columns 3 and 4 from table 5 also without
Newey-West standard errors and the estimates were exactly the same, but the stan-
dard errors were larger. I will use the restricted version of the model for all of the
following results, if not stated otherwise.
Table 5: OLS estimates for changes of yields of IG and HY Index with all maturities
unrestricted restricted
IG HY IG HY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
event date dummy −0.012∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009)
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Effect of event dates on IG and HY Index with different maturity bonds are described
in tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the OLS estimates for change of IG Index yields
with bond maturities 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years and over 10 years. Table 7 shows
36
the corresponding estimates for HY Index. On event dates, the yields decreased
for both indexes on all maturities. Yields decreased more on event dates for bonds
with HY credit rating than for bonds with IG credit rating. Yields decreased on
HY Index bonds, even though the bonds in the HY Index are not eligible for CSPP
purchases. This supports the portfolio rebalancing channel and especially the local
supply channel. According to Altavilla et al. (2015) some of the arbitrageurs have a
specific demand for assets with certain maturity. When the central bank purchases
assets from them, they replace the purchased assets with other assets that has the
same maturity. This seems to be the case on the corporate bond market. The an-
nouncement of the CSPP has caused a spillover to assets that have similar maturity
structure, but are not eligible for purchases.
IG Index yields decreased on event dates more for bonds with longer maturity.
The estimate for yields change for bonds with over 10 years maturity (-1.9 basis
points) is double the size of the estimate for bonds with maturity of 1 to 5 years
(-0.9 basis points). HY Index yields do not behave similarly. HY Index yields
decreased slightly more on the shortest maturity section of 1-5 years maturity bonds,
but stayed the same for the rest of the maturities. This results indicates that the
ECB’s announcement decreased the duration risk for the bonds that were eligible
for purchases (IG Index) and therefore the IG Index yield changes were larger on the
bonds with longer maturity. Seems that two types of portfolio balancing channel
are active on the corporate bond market: local supply channel and duration risk
channel. Some of the arbitrageurs changed from IG credit rating bond to bond with
HY credit rating with same maturity and some of the arbitrageurs changed from
short maturity IG bond to longer maturity IG bond.
Besides the yield effects, I also study how the CSPP related announcement affected
the interest rate expectations. Figure 5 shows the change in interest rate swap
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Table 6: OLS estimates for IG Index yield changes with different maturity bonds
IG 1-5 years IG 5-10 years IG over 10 years
(1) (2) (3)
event date dummy −0.009∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 7: OLS estimates for HY Index yield changes with different maturity bonds
HY 1-5 years HY 5-10 years HY over 10 years
(1) (2) (3)
event date dummy −0.025∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006)
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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curves on three different dates. Every one of these three dates has its own figure,
where the last price of the date and the last price of the previous date are compared.
Figure 5 shows that the prices of swap contracts reacted differently to CSPP related
announcements depending on the announcement. The announcement of the start of
the CSPP made on 10th of March 2016 increased the prices on all maturities and
especially for the ones with short maturity. On the contrary, the announcement of
CSPP details on 21st of April 2016 also increased the swap contract prices, but the
effect was increasing with contract maturity. ECB published information on 21st of
April about the maturity structure of the bonds being purchased under the CSPP.
The maximum maturity is 30 years. The actual start of the CSPP purchases on
8th of June 2016 did not have an effect on prices of interest swap contracts. This
strengthens the theory of Altavilla & Giannone (2016) about market reacting to new
information immediately. Because of that, the effect on the announcement date of
the programme is larger than the effect on the date when the purchases are started.
Market has already absorbed the new information before the actual purchases.
Table 8 describes the OLS estimates for the change in prices of the interest rate swap
contracts on a set of event dates relating to CSPP32. Upper part of the table shows
unrestricted estimates 33 and lower part of the table shows the restricted estimates.
The estimates and their standard errors are smaller when the regression takes into
account other possible macroeconomic variables than just the event dates. New in-
formation published on event dates, decreased the prices of the swap contracts with
smaller maturities and increased the prices of the contracts with longer maturities.
Prices of contracts with maturity of 1 day, 18 month and 3 years decreased, while
contracts with maturities of 6, 9 and 15 years increased. The effect was larger on the
most short and long maturities. The price of 1 day interest rate swap decreased by
32Event dates are listed on the Appendix A.
33without Newss,t
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19.3 basis points and the price of 15 year contract increased for 102.2 basis points.
Results suggest that the announcement of the CSPP changed the market expecta-
tions for ECB’s future policy rate decisions and therefore also the prices of swap
contracts. This supports the signalling channel, the announcement of the CSPP
programme successfully gave a signal to the market that ECB will not increase the
policy rate in the near future.
I do the same diagnostic checks for the model with interest rate swap contract prices
than I did to the model with IG and HY Index yields. The residual plot and Q-Q
plot for 18 month interest rate swap are described in the Appendix C. Contracts
with other maturities had similarly behaving residuals so to avoid unnecessary rep-
etition, I chose to document only the residuals of the 18 month swap contract.
Visual inspection of the residuals shows that there is a clear pattern on the resid-
uals. Breusch-Pagan test and Durbin-Watson test confirms that the residuals are
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated. It can also be seen from the Q-Q plot that the
residuals are not normally distributed. Because of the heteroscedasticity, I have used
Newey-West standard errors when estimating the price effects (Table 8). The model
clearly fits better to describe the yield changes than the swap price changes. The
autocorrelation of the residuals indicates that Newss,t does not include all variables
that have an effect to the contract prices.
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Besides the swap contracts, one method for determining the changes in interest rate
expectations is to examine the results of ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF). Figures 6 and 7 describe the expectations of ECB’s policy rate 3, 6, 9 and
12 months ahead from the time of the survey. The date on the horizontal axis is the
survey date. ECB announced that it is going to start the CSPP on 10th of March
2016. SPFs conducted before and right after the announcement are marked with ver-
tical lines into the figures. It is clear, that the forecasters revised their interest rate
forecasts downwards after the announcement of CSPP on all of the forecast horizons.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the forecasters were very unanimous until the announce-
ment of the CSPP. After that, there has been more variation in the replies. The grey
areas around the average line describe the densities of the replies. There is more
variation in the forecasts with longer horizons. This is reasonable, given that fore-
casting the interest rate is harder for longer time horizon. Year can be a long time for
economy and the probability of something surprising happening increases with time.
I used data from Google Trends and the transcript of ECB Governing Council’s mon-
etary policy meetings and based on these chose 20 event dates. I used the selected
event dates and a set of macroeconomic variables to determine how the yields of
IG and HY Indexes reacted to CSPP related announcements. I found out, that the
announcement decreased yields on both indexes, even though the HY Index does not
include any bonds that are eligible for purchases. This spillover indicates, that local
supply channel is active. I also noticed that yields of the IG Index decreased more
with bonds that have longer maturity. The result indicates that the duration risk
channel is active on the IG Index bonds. CSPP related announcements decreased
IG Index bond yields by 1.3 basis points and HY Index yields by 2.4 basis points.
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Figure 6: ECB’s SPF: Interest rate expectations
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The effect is smaller than the ones that previous researchers have found on PSPP34.
The relatively small effect of the CSPP may be due the small purchase volumes of
the CSPP in relation to PSPP and the fact that the indexes I investigated include
also non-purchasable assets. Also, CSPP was implemented on more stable financial
situation than the PSPP.
I used interest rate swap contracts when studying the possible effects of CSPP
announcement on expectations of ECB’s future policy rate. I used same event dates
as in the yield study and almost same set of macroeconomic variables. I found out
that the CSPP related announcements decreased prices of interest rate swaps on
small maturities and increased the prices on longer ones. Prices of the interest rate
swap increases when the interest rate expectations increase. I also used ECB’s SPF
to assess the possible changes the CSPP announcement had on forecasters’ interest
rate expectations. Results implicate that the announcement of the CSPP decreased
short-term interest rate expectations. This indicates that the signalling channel is
active.
34Regarding Altavilla et al. (2015) PSPP decreased yields by 30-50 basis points and according
to Andrade et al. (2016) by 26 basis points.
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7 Conclusions
In my thesis I study the effects of ECB’s corporate sector purchase programme
(CSPP) related policy announcements on corporate bond yields and assess the pos-
sible transmission channels. I do an event study with 20 event dates. The event
dates include meetings of the Governing Council that announced details of the CSPP
and speeches by officials of the ECB related to the possible expansion of existing
purchase programmes. I use Google Trends when choosing the set of event dates. Be-
sides the event dates, I also include a set of other macroeconomic variables that may
have affected the bond yields. When assessing the possible transmission channels,
I study how and in what magnitude the yields of different maturity bonds reacted
to the CSPP announcements. I also study how large was the possible change in
expectations for ECB’s policy rate on event dates.
The importance of extensive asset purchase programmes have increased during the
past decade. Various central banks have announced purchase programmes of dif-
ferent asset types. The need for studies regarding different purchase programmes
have increased. Purchase programmes operate through different transmission chan-
nels. It is important to understand the transmission mechanism to fully exploit the
potential benefits of the purchase programmes. CSPP is ECB’s most recent, and
therefore also the least studied purchase programme. Purpose of my thesis is to
determine what kind of effects the CSPP related announcements had in the bond
market and also what were the transmission channels in use.
All the data on my study ranges from 1st of April 2015 to 9th of June 2017. All the
data is either from Bloomberg or from ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. I use two
bond indexes whose yield changes I study. One of them includes bonds that have
an Investment Grade credit rating and that are eligible for CSPP and the other one
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includes bonds with High Yield credit rating that are not eligible for purchases. My
data includes also a set of macroeconomic variables (price indices, employment rates
and consumer confidence indexes). I also study the price changes of interest rate
swap contracts of different maturities on the same set of event dates.
My results show that the CSPP related announcements decreased bond yields of
both indexes. Yields of the HY Index decreased more than the yields of IG Index.
The decrease for HY Index bonds was the same size with all maturities. Yields of
the IG Index decreased more on the longer maturity bonds. I found evidence sup-
porting the portfolio balancing channel, duration risk channel, local supply channel
and signalling channel. Other channels may be active as well, but examining further
channels would be out of the scope of my thesis.
Results are in line with the other studies regarding ECB’s previous purchase pro-
grammes. On other studies the programme announcements also decreased yields.
Studies regarding the ECB’s PSPP implicate a larger yield decrease than my results.
This is reasonable considering the purchase volumes of the PSPP and CSPP. Public
sector bonds are purchased by multiple times larger quantities than the corporate
bonds. PSPP was announced little over a year before the CSPP and the financial
situation in Europe was more unstable on the announcement time of the PSPP.
The form of future monetary policy, after the economy has recovered, is still un-
known. Currently, central banks have massive holdings of assets purchased under
various programmes and the dissolution of the purchase programmes need to be
done carefully and will probably take several years. Forward guidance will be on
important role when ECB starts to shut down the purchase programmes.
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Appendices
A List of event dates
Date Event details
15 April 2015 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. ECB Presi-
dent Mario Draghi’s comments on the Q & A section of the meet-
ing regarding possible scracity of ECB’s QE programmes.
19 May 2015 Comment of ECB Governing Council member Christian Noyer
about possible further monetary policy actions.
3 September 2015 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. Draghi’s com-
ments on the Q & A section of the meeting regarding the flexibility
of ECB’s purchase programmes.
22 September 2015 Comment of ECB head economist Peter Praet regarding the pos-
sible adjustments to the purchase programmes.
15 October 2015 Comment of ECB Governing Council member Ewald Nowotny
about Europe’s poor economic condition.
22 October 2015 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. Draghi’s com-
ments on the Q & A section of the meeting regarding possible
further monetary policy stimulus.
3 November 2015 Draghi’s speech at the Reception for the Opening of the European
Cultural Days in Frankfurt.
11 November 2015 Comment of ECB Governing Council member Ignacio Visco about
possible new monetary policy instruments.
17 November 2015 Praet’s comments about inflation expectations.
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Date Event details
19 November 2015 Publication of Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Gov-
erning Council on 22 October. Account revealed that the Gov-
erning Council was planning further monetary policy easing on
October’s meeting.
20 November 2015 Draghi’s speech at the Frankfurt European Banking Congress.
21 January 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. Draghi’s com-
ments on the Q & A section of the meeting regarding possible new
monetary policy actions.
10 March 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. The Govern-
ing Council announced that it will start the CSPP in the second
quarter of 2016.
21 April 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. The Govern-
ing Council announced details regarding the CSPP purchases.
13 May 2016 ECB published a Q & A section about the CSPP on their website.
2 June 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. The Govern-
ing Council announced the remaining details regarding the CSPP
purchases.
8 June 2016 Purchases under CSPP started
21 July 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council.
8 December 2016 Monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council. The Govern-
ing Council announced that it will expand the EAPP from March
2017 to December 2017.
29 May 2017 Draghi’s speech at the Economic and Monetary Affairs of the Eu-
ropean Parliament.
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B Contents of Newss,t
Country Variable (Bloomberg ticker)
Euro area Consumer Confidence (EUCCEMU)
Euro area CPI MoM (ECCPEMUM)
Euro area Economic Confidence (EUESMU)
Euro area GDP SA QoQ (EUGNEMUQ)
Euro area Industrial Production SA MoM (EUITEMUM)
Euro area Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (MPMIEZMA)
Euro area Difference of ECB deposit rate and EONIA
France Consumer Confidence (FRCCO)
France CPI YoY (FRCPIYOY)
France GDP QoQ (FRGEGDPQ)
France Markit Manufacturing PMI (MPMIFRMA)
Germany IFO Business Climate (GRFIPBUS)
Germany Markit/BME Manufacturing PMI (MPMIDEMA)
Germany Unemployment Rate (GRUEPR)
Germany ZEW Survey Expectations (GRZEWI)
Italy Business Confidence (ITBCI)
Italy GDP WDA QoQ (ITPIRLQS)
Italy Industrial Production MoM (ITPRSANM)
Italy Markit/ADACI Manufacturing PMI (MPMIITMA)
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Country Variable (Bloomberg ticker)
Spain Markit Manufacturing PMI (MPMIESMA)
Spain Retail Sales YoY (SPRSWDSY)
Spain Unemployment rate (SPUNEMPR)
Spain CPI EU Harmonized YoY (SPCPEUYY)
United States Chicago Business Parameter (CHPMINDX)
United States CPI MoM (CPICHNG)
United States GDP Annualized QoQ (GDPCQOQ)
United States GDP Price Index (GDPPIQQ)
United States Initial Jobless Claims (INJCJC)
United States ISM Manufacturing (NAPMPMI)
United States University of Michigan Sentiment (CONSSENT)
United States Unemployment Rate (USURTOT)
United States Change in Nonfarm Payrolls (NFPTCH)
United States Change in Oil price (USD/barrel)
C Diagnostic checks
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Figure 8: Residuals of model (1) with IG (upper figure) and HY Index (lower figure)
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Figure 9: Q-Q plot for IG Index and HY Index residuals
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Figure 10: Residuals and Q-Q plot for interest rate swap prices (18 months)
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